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he forces of globalization and influence of
international institutions, in combination with
domestic economic realities and politics, are
reshaping the food security policy and strategy
of various countries, including the Philippines.
For the Philippines, in particular, the pressure is great
for it to respond immediately and come up with an effective
strategy in view of what is increasingly becoming a crisis
situation in the country insofar as agricultural and food pro-
duction is concerned. However, from all accounts, the Phil-
ippine government has been experiencing difficulty in push-
ing for the needed reforms to improve agricultural and food
productivity, especially in rice and grains production.
What accounts for this? To better appreciate the situ-
ation, it is useful to review the Philippines' performance in
rice production through the years as well as the develop-
ments in the country's political and institutional setups that
have heavily impinged on its capacity in rice and other grains
production.
This Policy Notes will thus outline a short history of
the efforts undertaken by the Philippine government in this
front, identify and assess the key problems encountered in
pushing for the reforms, and present the prospects—and
recommendations—for drawing up a policy reform program
for Philippine food security.
Philippine rice production1 and efforts in food
security program
Over the period 1980-2000, the average growth in
Philippine total rice production was 2.4 percent per year. In
comparison with the country's average growth rate in popu-
lation at 2.3 percent for the same period, such rate was
quite slow so that by the 1990s, total rice usage in the
PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS
researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach
and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
This Notes is based on the paper entitled "The Globalization of
Food Security: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines" by the same
author. Ms. Jennifer P.T. Liguton helped in recasting/repackaging this
Notes. The views expressed are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect those of PIDS or any of the study's sponsors.2 November 2002
Policy Notes
Philippines was already regularly outstripping domestic rice
production.
From that time until the present, the Philippines has
therefore shifted from a state of marginal self-sufficiency to
that of being a regular and growing rice importer. The im-
ports came from the country's rice-producing neighbors in
the ASEAN region, Vietnam and Thailand, whose growth in
rice productivity literally spurted upwards and left the Philip-
pines far behind.
It was not as if the Philippines never enjoyed a com-
parative advantage. In the 1970s, in fact, the Philippine
government emerged as a leading implementor of the so-
called "green revolution" and successfully met its food se-
curity challenges. The subsequent "excesses" of the dicta-
torship under the martial law years, however, dissipated
such gains, thus turning the Philippines into a significant
importer of rice by 1986 when the Marcos regime was
toppled by the People Power Revolution of 1986.
The Grains Sector Development Program (GSDP)
One of the major challenges faced by the Aquino ad-
ministration when it took over in 1986 was food security. It
was acutely aware that unless it instituted major reforms in
food price and buffer stocking, the Philippines' record in
this front would be forever problematic. Thus, amidst the
high level of international goodwill and hopes during that
period, the Aquino administration formulated the Grains
Sector Development Program (GSDP) and began the nego-
tiations for the GSDP loans between the Philippine govern-
ment and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). While nego-
tiations began as early as in 1990, the Philippine govern-
ment and the ADB reached agreement on the terms of the
loans only in year 2000, with the loans becoming effective
in August 2000 under President Joseph Estrada and Agri-
culture Secretary Edgardo  Angara. It took 10 years—from
project identification to effectivity—for the GSDP loans to
take full completion. In terms of political regimes, this trans-
lates to three Presidents and five Secretaries of Agricul-
ture!
What is the GSDP? The GSDP is an integrated pack-
age of policy and institutional reforms, sector investments
and advisory technical assistance (TA) projects aimed at
making the grains sector more productive and internation-
ally competitive while helping the country meet its food se-
curity objectives. It consists of two loans totaling US$175
million, to be disbursed from 2000 to 2005 and to finance
important components of the country's programs in grains
productivity, food security and poverty alleviation.
The first loan—US$75 million—will finance invest-
ments in irrigation, advanced rice and corn production tech-
nology, and improved capacity in policy and planning. The
second loan of US$100 million will be provided as general
budget support, to be released in three tranches, contin-
gent on policy and institutional reforms aimed at expanding
private sector participation in rice marketing, and at improv-
ing the efficiency of the National Food Authority (NFA), the
implementation of key aspects of the food security program,
and the targeting of food subsidies to the poor.
At the Heart of the Reforms:
the National Food Authority
Some Unfinished Business
The government food parastatal—the National Food
Authority (NFA)—continues to exercise monopoly powers
over the international trade of rice in the Philippines. Along
with South Korea, the country remains one of only two
countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO) that
maintains quantitative restrictions (QRs) on rice imports.
The monopoly power of the NFA and its tight
implementation of these QRs have maintained high
farmgate and thereby high consumer rice prices in the
country. This has contributed to an overreliance of
policymakers on price intervention instruments rather than
productivity increases to support farmers' incomes and
ensure domestic food security.
As set by law (Presidential Decree 4 of 1972), the
mission of the NFA is praiseworthy: buy high (from farmers),
sell low (to consumers) and store long (to stabilize prices).
However, its performance over the past three decades shows
that it has been impossible to successfully achieve its mission
(TA 3429, 2001).3 No. 2002-08
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The investment loan will be implemented within five
years, with completion expected by 31 December 2004. The
policy loan, meanwhile, was expected to be released to the
government within 24 months from loan effectivity in three
tranches: (a) US$30 million upon effectivity in August 2000,
(b) US$30 million by May 2001, and (c) US$40 million by
August 2002. Each release is subject to the fulfillment of
agreed policy reforms. The Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Finance (DOF) are the joint execut-
ing agencies for the policy loan.
Status of GSDP-linked policy reforms, May 2002
As indicated in the GSDP loan terms, the attainment
of the policy goals set in the GSDP policy matrix would serve
as the triggers for the release of financing under the GSDP
Program Loan. Three tranches were agreed upon: the first
upon loan effectivity and compliance with the first tranche
release conditions. The terms linked to the first tranche
were completed in August 2000. The second tranche condi-
tions were programmed for completion by May 2001. As of
May 2002, however, these conditions have yet to be fully
met. Finally, the terms linked to the third tranche were pro-
grammed for completion within 24 months from loan effec-
tivity or by August 2002. As of July 2002, though, there is
no expectation that this deadline will be met.
More specifically, as of May 2002, the fulfillment of
agreements under the second tranche of the GSDP Policy
Matrix was already one year behind the schedule envisioned
by the Philippine government and the ADB at the time of
loan effectivity in August 2000. The key reason for the de-
lay in the fulfillment of agreements has been the change in
thinking on the part of the Philippine government regarding
the key aspects of the policy matrix. The change in thinking
came about as a result of changes in the officials involved
due to the change in administration from that of former Presi-
dent Joseph Estrada to the present President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo.
The Secretary of Agriculture under the Arroyo adminis-
tration, Mr. Leonardo Q. Montemayor, has expressed weak
to negative support for the key aspects of the reforms, in
particular: (a) the reduction of total procurement by the NFA
of rice from and incentive payments to farmers, and (b) the
replacement of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on rice im-
ports by tariffs, as well as the presidential certification as
urgent of the legislation required to effect the replacement.
It is quite clear therefore that at this stage, the re-
forms will take much more time to implement, if ever. To
begin with, there is no sense of urgency felt within the gov-
ernment on the need for the reforms. Moreover, the simple
need for time and logistics will demand at least a few months
for implementation. But what may constitute as the stron-
gest possible constraint is the visible resistance to the re-
forms from those who stand to lose from it, namely: (a) the
representatives of the few farmers who do benefit from NFA
procurement, (b) the NFA Employees Association whose
members fear the possibility of privatization under the re-
forms, and (c) the grains businessmen who have developed
their enterprises around the fact that the NFA is a monopoly.
The rice sector governance issue
Reforms—especially those relating to policy—are
largely dependent on the kind of governance existing in the
particular sector concerned. This is quite true and evident
in the Philippines' agriculture, specifically rice, sector where
the frequent changes among the bureaucrats affected the
quality of governance—and subsequently reforms.
Changing leaders, changing styles, changing
       programs
Virtually all senior level officials of the executive de-
partments of the Philippine government, from the level of
Assistant Director up to the Secretary, are political appoin-
tees. They are appointed directly by the President of the
Philippines. For example, at the DA, about 180 posts are to
be filled by presidential appointment. Thus, when presidents
change, the appointees at the top levels of government also
change. And since there have been four changes of presi-
dents since the departure of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986,
there have been at least four sets of changes in political
appointees.
There are, of course, ongoing efforts to create a per-
manent civil service through the Career Executive Service
Officer (CESO) system but the process of institutionalizing
such system has been slow due to its nature of accredita-4 November 2002
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tion and qualification. Moreover, even with the existence of
the CESO system, appointing authorities have often chosen
to override the system or ignore its controls.
At the agriculture sector, since 1971, eleven Secre-
taries of Agriculture have been appointed, with each one
serving for an average period of 33 months as shown in
Table 1.
With each changing of the guard came changes in
sectoral and departmental goals, objectives, strategies, time-
tables, programs, projects and activities. New people in the
top positions of the department meant, at the very least,
changes in leadership styles and work arrangements.
The combination of new initiatives and people new to
government service meant that some time was necessary
to "learn the job." This required a very steep learning curve
over a short period—and not a few birthing pains and mis-
takes. The task of learning the job is also complicated by
the need for visibility and impact as soon as possible after
taking office. This pressure results in two major initial pre-
occupation upon entry: (a) the need to erase the programs
of the previous appointee, and (b) the need to announce
programs labeled as one's own—no matter if the difference
is only the label.
The political nature of cabinet and other
senior level posts in government has empha-
sized this need for visibility and impact. Thus,
Cabinet members, and in this case, the vari-
ous Secretaries of Agriculture, often find
themselves rushed to announce half-baked
goals, agenda and programs even before they
have had an opportunity to thoroughly review
the challenges they need to face and the
options available to them.
Each of the administrations since 1986
has had so much to do, so little time, and
not much experience on how to get the job
done. Combined with a situation where there
was political opposition anxious to capital-
ize on mistakes, this predicament has helped
foster an atmosphere where cabinet mem-
bers are replaced at the first mistake—how-
ever unavoidable—whether in perception or in actuality. A
culture of "cabinet revamps" and replacements of one or
many officials has thus emerged. In turn, such an atmo-
sphere has emphasized political expediency and a focus on
short-term gains, often at the expense of sustainable, long-
term effectiveness.
Prospects for grains sector reforms
in the Philippines
Based on the above, what are the prospects for imple-
menting the needed reforms in the country's grains sector,
in particular that for rice?
At this stage, it is clear that much still needs to be
done. The policy reforms covered in the GSDP policy matrix
have not progressed as expected due to the combined ef-
fects of the following factors. One, the outlook and strategy
on grains sector reforms at the DA has changed. Two, the
time and resources required for the advocacy and comple-
tion of the envisioned reforms in the face of the sheer size
and diversity of the stakeholders, were underestimated. And
three, the resistance to the reforms mounted by certain
stakeholder groups—notably the farmer-leaders who have
directly received benefits from NFA's operations and the NFA
Employees Association—had been intense.
Period Secretary Months
of Agriculture of Service
January 1971 - June 1984 Arturo M. Tanco* 162
July 1984 - February 1986 Salvador H. Escudero 20
March 1986 - February 1987 Ramon V. Mitra 12
March 1987 - December 1989 Carlos G. Dominguez 34
January 1990 - June 1992 Senen C. Bacani 30
July 1992 - February 1996 Roberto S. Sebastian 44
March 1996 - June 1998 Salvador H. Escudero 25
July 1998 - April 1999 William D. Dar** 9
May 1999 - December 2000 Edgardo J. Angara 19
January 6 - February 15, 2001 Domingo F. Panganiban 1
February 16 - present (June 2002) Leonardo Q. Montemayor 17
*Including as Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources and Agrarian Reform
**Acting Secretary
Table 1. Department of Agriculture Leadership, 1971-2002
As of June 20025 No. 2002-08
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Thereupon, it can be said that moving the grains sec-
tor reforms forward is much less a challenge of policy analy-
sis as it is one of political management. The operational
goal of the political administration concerned with the posi-
tive contributions of the grains sector in sustainable na-
tional development is thus the building and deployment of
political coalitions in support of the key grains sector reforms.
It is also useful to note that in the international litera-
ture, one observation given regarding the possibility of suc-
cess or failure of policy reforms involving agricultural or food
subsidies is that: In general, reforms that reduce food sub-
sidies are successful in the context of fiscal crises. The
obvious reason for this is that during a fiscal crisis, the
government can no longer afford to continue providing sub-
sidies.
In the present Philippine situation, however, it seems
that the government still continues to shift the fiscal burden
of food price subsidies to future administrations and gen-
erations through the programs of the NFA despite the NFA's
very precarious financial state. By providing sovereign guar-
antees on NFA's behalf and giving it authority to borrow from
commercial banks for its operations, programs and even
debt service, the government avoids having to appropriate
funds directly to support the NFA's food subsidy programs.
In the process, however, the NFA accumulates outstanding
obligations to the commercial banks that consequently re-
quire growing debt service payments. This, in turn, increases
the government's overall burden of contingent liabilities.
Clearly, this situation cannot and should not continue
indefinitely. Thereupon, the implementation of reforms for
the grains sector becomes imperative.
What is the context wherein the reforms are to be
encouraged and undertaken?
As in many other countries, grains sector issues are
very politically sensitive in the Philippines. However, in the
Philippines, the political sensitivity of rice in particular is
due not only to the fact that changes in staple food prices
significantly affect the welfare of farmers and consumers,
albeit in opposite directions, but also because popular no-
tions of national pride are at least partly based on the achieve-
ment of national self-sufficiency in the production of rice.
Furthermore, the grains sector comprises a very large
number of stakeholders, not only on the supply side, but
also on the multi-layered demand side as well as on the
processing and distribution chains for various related prod-
ucts in between. The interests of these stakeholders di-
verge as well as change, depending on changing economic
conditions and opportunities.
The management of the sector is therefore a very com-
plex challenge. Decisionmaking in modern Philippine soci-
ety is influenced by an unfettered press, a dynamic and
interventionist legislature, and a citizenry that often exer-
cises its rights to freely assemble and act. These features
of openness and participatory action make media a very
important tool as well as participant in the decisionmaking
process. In turn, the decisionmaking hierarchy is particu-
larly sensitive to media since the latter helps shape the
political implications of policy decisions.
The stage for decisions
At this point in the process of grains sector reforms in
the Philippines, there are several options that may be con-
sidered in pushing the reforms forward. The options are
defined by: (a) shared development vision, (b) fiscal pres-
sures and public expenditure requirements, and (c) timing,
particularly the pressures of 2004.
Shared development vision. It is crucial to maintain a
continuing agreement between the Philippine government
and the ADB that the reforms indicated in the GSDP policy
matrix are economically correct. The two key and interre-
lated elements of a shared development vision are: (a) tar-
iffs, instead of QRs, for the protection of farmers and the
generation of revenues to finance sector development, and
(b) a streamlined subsidy strategy with the NFA providing
more efficient food price subsidies for consumers at much
lower cost. If there is no agreement between the govern-
ment and the ADB on these key elements of tariffication
and streamlining of food subsidies, then the parties would
be better off by restarting the dialogue on grains sector
reforms.6 November 2002
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Fiscal pressures and public expenditure require-
ments. Does the government need—and when does it
need—the financing made available under the GSDP? Of
the US$100 million arising from the program loan compo-
nent, only $30 million has been released. The second tranche
of $30 million has been pending since May 2001. Of the
$75 million investment loan, less than one million dollars
has been released, fully two years after the loan effectivity.
The government has already incurred obligations arising from
commitment fees on the unwithdrawn balances. To resolve
this and other related issues, the DOF should come up with
a definitive position on the GSDP loan's role in the
government's overall fiscal position, particularly in the short
run.
Timing: 2004. National elections will take place in
mid-2004 whereas action on the country's self-imposed
commitments on the rice's QR reform must be done by De-
cember 31, 2004. However, by mid-2003, the identified
contenders for national positions will already be campaign-
ing in earnest and will be very wary of policy positions that
may reduce support for them in the elections. Given the
political sensitivity of the grains sector reforms, some ac-
tions on it may be considered unpopular. Thus, any mea-
sure to be undertaken related to said reforms must be made
as soon as possible within 2002 at the latest. Any such
initiative not completed by late 2002 can only be taken up
again after the 2004 elections. Should the rice tariff reform
measure not be passed into law before say, February 2003,
then the parties should reprogram reform actions to restart
in late 2004 at the earliest.
Immediate options on the GSDP policy matrix
and loans
Given the above, a number of options for the imple-
mentation of the GSDP policy reform measures are open in
the immediate term—within the rest of 2002. These are:
(1) no definitive action in 2002, neither by the government
nor by the ADB, (2) completion by government of the terms
of the current policy matrix in 2002, (3) immediate renego-
tiation of the policy matrix and implementation of the
amended policy matrix in 2002, and (4) agreement to im-
mediately cancel the GSDP loans and embark on a fresh
start on new development assistance to become effective
in 2004.
Philippine food security policy and strategy
in flux: some recommendations
@ At the same time that the political and controver-
sial nature of the rice sector policy reforms is recognized, it
cannot be denied that making a decision cannot be avoided
and that the feasible policy direction is ultimately toward a
pragmatic liberalization of rice trade. It is best that the gov-
ernment accept this reality and begin, as early as possible,
to build coalitions in support of such reforms.
@ It is crucial that some stability and long-term vi-
sion is institutionalized into sector management. At the very
least, a professional, long-term technical core group of
managers, administrators and technical experts must be
installed in each of the departments concerned.
@ The poor performance of the Philippines in sector
management over the last two decades is partly traceable
to the discontinuous and disjointed attention to the man-
agement of the agriculture sector, highlighted by domestic
politicking. Unless strong measures are immediately taken
to stabilize sector leadership on a definitive and sustain-
able growth path cognizant of globalization, the agriculture
and rural sector will continue to be mired in stagnation.
Even worse is that poverty and hunger will continue to
deepen.      
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